Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules that Arbitration Order Reinstating In-House Counsel Violates Public Policy

This week, In Sands v. Menard, the Wisconsin Supreme Court set aside an arbitration order that had reinstated an in-house lawyer who had prevailed on an Equal Pay Act claim. This reverses the holding of the lower appeal court that was discussed in a blog post in April 2009.

The court ruled that the arbitration panel exceeded its authority in ordering reinstatement because – in this case -- plaintiff could not ethically continue to represent defendant; therefore, the reinstatement violated public policy. The arbitration panel had indicated that it would award either front pay or reinstatement. It chose reinstatement. The Wisconsin Supreme Court ordered that an appropriate award of front pay be made.

The majority expressly left open the question of whether the Rules of Professional Conduct, which give employers the right to discharge attorneys at any time, apply when the defendant has violated non-discrimination laws.

Three judges dissented.

Whatever the legal merits of this case, given the facts -- it is difficult to imagine how plaintiff could have continued as defendant’s in-house counsel.


 

Ninth Circuit Clarifies What Is Necessary for Attorney-Client Privilege to Apply to Actual Employees and Functional Employees

At my first oral argument – a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute – opposing counsel argued that the judge should not dismiss the case because his co-counsel would get his a** in a sling. The judge pointed out that the assertion was not his most attractive argument.

That came to mind today when I read United States v. Graff. The Ninth Circuit decision sets out what is necessary for an employee to claim the benefit of a company's attorney client privilege. That said, as described in the decision, defendant was not an attractive candidate for anything but the most narrow application of the attorney client privilege.

Defendant had set up an health insurance company, fraudulently marketed coverage, and diverted a significant amount of the company’s funds to buy jewelry, a sports car and a house, while some people who allegedly were insured had their credit ratings destroyed, failed to get a kidney transplant, or almost failed to get necessary chemotherapy, etc.

Defendant argued that evidence presented at trial by the corporation’s attorneys was privileged. He claimed that he had an independent relationship with the lawyers because he was not an employee of the company. As a corporate consultant, he and the company had a joint relationship with counsel; the company couldn’t waive his privilege.

He wasn’t an employee because he couldn’t be – he was banned from insurance work in the State of California. Unsurprisingly, the court determined that he was functionally an employee of the company and did not have an independent relationship with counsel. The decision sets forth what is necessary for a finding that a person who, although technically not an employee, is functionally an employee.

After determining that defendant was a functional employee, the court went on to determine if – as an individual -- he shared the attorney client privilege with the corporation. The decision adopted a five-part analysis to make this determination:

• Did the employee approach the attorneys for the purpose of seeking legal advice;
• When he did so, did he make it clear to the attorneys that he was seeking legal advice in his individual rather than in his representative capacity;
• Did the attorneys see fit to represent him personally, knowing a conflict could arise;
• Were his conversations with the attorneys in confidence; and
• The substance of the conversations with the attorneys did not concern matters within the company or the general affairs of the company.

This issue comes up frequently -- mercifully, not in a fact pattern this dramatic -- so this is an important case. Employees, and management, must understand that the lawyers represent the company – not the individuals in the executive suite.
 

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If you want to claim attorney client privilege, make sure at least one person is licensed to practice law.

Last week the New York Law Journal featured two decisions regarding attorney-client and work product disputes in litigation between Gucci America and Guess?.

In the first decision, the protection of the attorney-client privilege was denied because Gucci’s in-house lawyer was not an active member of any bar – he only maintained inactive status in California.

Active bar membership is necessary for the benefit of the attorney client privilege. There is an exception to this rule where: the lawyer fraudulently held himself out to the client as an attorney; the clients genuinely and reasonably believe that the person is an attorney; and if, pursuant to this belief, the client made confidential communications to the person. Here, Gucci’s belief that the in-house counsel was a lawyer was unreasonable – it never tried to confirm the extent of the counsel’s qualifications.

This decision has implications for everyone: clients must take steps to confirm that their lawyers maintain active bar membership; litigators, in disputes where attorney client privilege is asserted, should confirm that the communications involved a licensed attorney as well as substance protected by the privilege. The information regarding bar status is usually available on-line.

The second decision involves work product privilege and choice of law issues between United States and Italian law. Gucci was instructed to revise its privilege log, and to meet and confer with opposing counsel before returning to the court for decision.
 

Settlement of All Claims, Settles All Claims

I was taught to expressly include costs and attorneys’ fees in any release or settlement agreement because – if I didn’t -- the opposing party would come back and demand that the client pay those claims on top of the settlement amount. I always did it but, frankly, I thought this was an urban legend. I was wrong -- this issue made it all the way to the Washington Supreme Court. The dispute in McGuire v Bates illustrates the wisdom of using belts and suspenders when drafting agreements.

After a settlement of $2,180 plaintiff asserted that the settlement of “all claims” did not include statutory attorneys fees, which are awarded to a prevailing party in Washington in certain situations. An arbitrator denied this claim; the Superior Court decided plaintiff was the prevailing party and awarded attorneys' fees, costs and interest on the settlement amount.  The Court of Appeals affirmed.  The Washington Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, reversed and ruled that a settlement of “all claims” includes a claim for attorney fees.

Despite this decision, it seems like a good idea to always expressly include costs and attorney fees in any settlement and release, since one superior court judge and an appellate panel saw this the other way.