Is Washington's Refusal to Enforce Consumer Class Action Prohibitions Still Good Law?

Here’s a topic for a few law review articles (not this blog). What is the effect, if any, of yesterday’s Supreme Court decision in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, on the Washington Supreme Court’s decision in McKee v. AT&T, which struck down a contractual prohibition on class actions?  Here is a blog post I did in 2008 regarding McKee.

Yesterday's case reversed the Ninth Circuit, which had applied California law, but the statements regarding the Federal Arbitration Act and its intent, raise questions for anyone dealing with consumer claims.

 


 

NY Court of Appeals Clarifies What Constitutes Improper Solicitation After Sale of Good Will of A Business

This is an update to a post I did last September about solicitation of former customers after the sale of the good will of a business. The Second Circuit requested that the NY Court of Appeals give guidance on whether New York still implied a covenant of non-solicitation of former customers after the sale of the good will of a business, and, if it did, what are its limits.

Today, in Bessemer Trust Co. v. Branin, The court ruled that there is still an implied covenant of non-solicitation of former customers after the sale of the good will of a business. Determining whether there has been improper solicitation is a question of fact.

The court recognized that there is always a risk on the part of the purchaser of a business that customers will decide to go elsewhere as a result of the change in ownership. The decision discusses how a seller of good will – who is no longer working for the purchaser -- may respond to former customers who inquire about the seller’s current employer or business.

Here is the bottom line:

while a seller may not contact his [*9]former clients directly, he may, "in response to inquiries" made on a former client's own initiative, answer factual questions. Furthermore, under the circumstances where a client exercising due diligence requests further information, a seller may assist his new employer in the "active development . . . of a plan" to respond to that client's inquiries. Should that plan result in a meeting with a client, a seller's "largely passive" role at such meeting does not constitute improper solicitation in violation of the "implied covenant." As such, a seller or his new employer may then accept the trade of a former client.

If you plan on doing this, read the entire opinion carefully.

 

 

NY Court of Appeals Joins Other States in Allowing Special Admission of In-House Counsel

Effective April 20, 2011, lawyers will be able to act as in-house counsel for New York organizations without satisfying the traditional requirements. The new 22 NYCRR Part 522 sets forth the proof required for the special admission, what is required for compliance, what services may be performed, and how to terminate the admission.

Anyone who is working in-house without being admitted in NY should pay close attention as the rule sets forth time limits for admission, and states that failure to comply with the rule is professional misconduct.
 

NY Court of Appeals Rules that Choice of Law Analysis Is Necessary To Reject Or Approve Insurance Claims Made To Liquidator

Normally, I would think that "interesting" and "choice of law" was an oxymoron. But, a decision issued yesterday by the NY Court of Appeals, Matter of Liquidation of Midland Insurance Co., is actually interesting – it deals with what substantive law applies to claims submitted against an insurer that has been placed into liquidation in New York. The law applicable to liquidated insurers is probably relevant to any entity with pollution and/or toxic tort issues because many insurers facing these claims have been judged insolvent and placed into liquidation. The decision particularly analyzes the language of Article 74 of the Insurance Law of New York, but is a good summary of New York law regarding insurance choice of law.

Not surprisingly, the liquidator (the Superintendent of the NYS Insurance Department) argued that New York substantive law should apply to all decisions to disallow claims of policyholders. The claimants argued that claim determinations required a choice of law analysis to determine the substantive state law applicable to each policy. The court decides that the “grouping of contacts” analysis must be made to determine what state’s law controls whether a claim in the liquidation may be allowed or denied.

This seems like good news for insurance claimants in states that have laws that generally favor policy holders, and bad news for those in more restrictive states (after all, there is only one pot of money here), and a lot of work for the insurance liquidator.

From my perspective, this would be easy to argue on both sides.