NY Court of Appeals Reads Entire Asset Purchase Agreement to Include Liabilities

It must be pretty distressing for a company that purchased the assets of a boiler business in 1970 to learn that it really purchased the prior owner’s asbestos liability, but that is what OakFabco learned today when the New York Court of Appeals issued its decision in American Standard, Inc. v. OakFabco, Inc.

I know that I’ve been plenty distressed when I’ve read old agreements with internally conflicting language. In this case, my guess is that the current owners wish that more attention had been paid to the “whereas” clause and the agreement to service the seller’s customers when the sale took place forty years ago.

The asset purchase agreement defined the liabilities assumed with the assets as “all the debts, liabilities, obligations and commitments (fixed or contingent) connected with or attributable to [seller] existing and outstanding at the Closing Date.” The purchaser -- relying on this definition -- claimed that tort liabilities, which did not exist as of the closing date, were not part of the transaction.

However, the court did not limit its analysis to the agreement’s definition of liabilities. It read the asset purchase agreement as a whole, including the agreement’s statement of purpose, the definition of liabilities, and the hold harmless provision. The agreement’s statement of purpose stated that the assets were being sold “subject to all debts, liabilities and obligations connected with or attributable to” the business. In addition, the purchaser had agreed to hold the seller harmless against the defined liabilities – in other words those existing and outstanding as of the closing date – but also all warranty, service, repair and return obligations for products sold on or before the transaction closed.

Ouch. Hopefully, insurance was one of the assets purchased. In any event, the decision shows the importance of the language of a “whereas” clause, and that – no matter how great it seems to get access to an existing customer base -- a buyer should be wary of agreeing to service the seller’s customers and warrantees at its own expense.

An interesting procedural point was discussed in the decision. The Appellate Division had enjoined the purchaser from re-litigating the liability issue. The Court of Appeals ruled that an injunction is not the appropriate remedy for stopping repeated litigation. The Court of Appeals vacated the injunction noting that parties may take any position they want in litigation provided it is raised in good faith; however, they might be precluded from doing once it has been decided.

 

 

Asbestos left in place doesn not trigger CERCLA or RCRA liability

Good news for any business (or individual for that matter) that has sold a property containing asbestos wrapped piping or boilers.  In Sycamore Industrial Park Associates v. Ericsson, Inc. the Seventh Circuit has ruled that there is no CERCLA or RCRA liability where the seller simply left the insulated equipment in place.  The appellate court affirmed summary judgment in the seller’s favor.

The seller left an old heating system in place when it sold the property to one of its employees.  The seller was no longer using the facility and the buyer wanted to use it as an industrial park.  The old unused asbestos insulated heating system was left in place.  Nineteen years later, asbestos was discovered in the old system.  The buyer sued the seller to compel removal of the asbestos.  It claimed that leaving the material there was a violation of CERCLA and RCRA.  However, the court ruled that the sale of the property was not “disposal” of the asbestos. The court did describe some circumstances in which this might not apply – such as a facility owner who wants to get rid of  a toxic retaining pond and sells a facility to an unsuspecting purchaser.

 

 


 

Washington Refuses to Find Manufacturer Liable for Failure to Warn of Hazards of Another's Product Used As a Replacement Component

Taking it a step further, in a second asbestos product liability case decided today, Braaten v. Saberhagen Holdings  the Washington Supreme Court refused to hold a manufacturer liable for duty to warn of dangers of exposure to  asbestos in replacement parts that it did not manufacture. 

The products in issue were pumps, which used asbestos packing and gaskets.  The manufacturers did not specify that asbestos packing and gaskets had to be used when the original packing and gaskets were replaced.

The defendant manufacturers did not sell replacement packing or gaskets and plaintiff was not able to sufficiently demonstrate that he was exposed to the original product.  The court noted that even where the replacement products were virtually the same as the original there would be no liability where defendant was not the manufacturer.  This opinion is pretty strong, but maybe there would be a claim for design defect if asbestos containing components were specified by the manufacturer, or, if this didn’t involve asbestos.

The case also refused to impose liability in connection with exposure to the asbestos insulation used around the pumps.

Again, three judges dissented.



 

Washington Refuses to Find Manufacturer Liable for Failure to Warn of Hazards of Another's Product

Today, the Washington Supreme Court refused to hold a manufacturer liable for failing to warn of the danger of another manufacturer’s product.  The case Simonetta v. Viad Corporation involved a claim for personal injury as a result of asbestos exposure. Because the plaintiff was exposed to asbestos before 1981, the court decided the case using common law principles of negligence and strict liability rather than the Washington Product Liability Act.

Defendant manufactured and sold an evaporator, which did not contain asbestos but which was encapsulated with insulation (asbestos) when it was used.  In order to maintain the product, the insulation had to be disturbed.  In an extensive opinion, the court ruled that there was no duty to warn of the dangers of asbestos because defendant did not manufacture, supply or sell it.  Liability for negligent failure to warn is limited to those in the chain of distribution of the hazardous product.  Strict liability attaches to the manufacturer of a product.  Here the dangerous product was asbestos not the evaporator.  The opinion is must reading for anyone who wants (needs to) distinguish between strict liability for failure to warn and negligent failure to warn. 

There was a three judge dissent which would have found that plaintiff stated a prima facie case for negligence and strict liability.